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The prediction of McKinnon’s Complementarity Hypothesis (McKinnon 1973) is that money and 
investment are complimentary due to self-financed investment and that the real interest rate is the 
key determinant of capital formation for financially repressed developing economies. Tanzania 
has experienced a long spell of financial repression as manifested in government putting caps or 
ceilings on interest rates, state ownership or control of domestic banks and financial institutions, 
heavy bank borrowing by government, restrictions on entry to the financial industry and directing 
credit to certain sectors and public entities. Although financial repression can facilitate economic 
development, for the case of most developing countries it is hypothesized by McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) that it retards savings and investment and thereby inhibits capital formation and 
economic growth. This paper critically appraises the complementarity hypothesis in Tanzania by 
an empirical approach. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model estimation results and 
the Bounds Test are supportive of the hypothesis, confirming basic complementarity between 
accumulation of money balances and investment. Higher real interest rates raise capital formation 
via the increase in real money balances. The policy implication is an exit from financial repression 
by achieving positive market determined interest rates in order to secure greater levels of 
investment. 
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The McKinnon (1973) complementarity hypothesis states that money and real capital assets are 
complements in developing countries. Due to absence of deep financial markets and extensive 
financial intermediation, before indivisible investment projects can be undertaken money balances 
have to be accumulated. This implies that the higher the real rate of return, the greater the 
accumulation of money balances and the larger will be the inducement to invest. Since investment 
is indivisible the demand for money will be larger, the greater the ratio of investment to total 
income. In developing countries, there is lack of organized capital and money markets, absence of 
wide spectrum of financial and physical instruments for the individuals to store their wealth and 
absence of deep financial markets and extensive financial intermediation. The implication is that 
money balances have to be accumulated before indivisible investment projects can be undertaken. 
In addition, the indivisibility of investment means that the demand for money will be larger the 
greater the ratio of investment to total income. Furthermore, the lack of organized capital and 
money markets limits the spectrum of financial and physical instruments for the individuals to 
store their wealth.  
 
The important point of McKinnon's hypothesis is that an increase in the desired rate of capital 
accumulation (private savings) at any given level of income leads to an increase in the average 
demand for real balances. This implies that a rise in return on capital leads to an increase in the 
need of real cash balance holding for accumulation purpose. Thus, money is not a competing asset; 
rather money is conduit through which accumulation takes place in developing countries. This 
implies that an increase in real return on money can raise sharply investment saving propensities 
in contrast to neoclassical theory where return on money does not directly affect propensity to save 
because all firms have perfect access to external finance. So higher return on money enlarges real 
cash balance holding thus relaxing the saving- investment bottleneck in developing countries. The 
McKinnon hypothesis provides theoretical basis for the policy of financial liberalization and it has 
brought a shift in the policy priorities of different countries in different regions.  
 
The government of Tanzania implemented typical sets of restrictions during the 1970s to the 
1990s. The restrictions, apart from interest rate controls,  included government ownership of 
commercial banks on which severe liquidity restrictions were imposed; snuffing out competition 
by restricting private ownership and foreign banks’ entry; discriminatory credit policies where 
very few sectors enjoyed unfettered credit at low interest rates to exclusively licensed import 
activities, highly protected manufacturing, crop boards, cooperative societies and publicly 
controlled utilities; compulsory holding of low yielding government debt and foreign exchange 
restrictions. 
 
During1970s to mid 1990s high cash requirements and direct credit allocation were introduced. 
During the same period, due to nationalization of financial institutions and industrial units, the 
landscape of financial sector was totally changed from privatized to complete nationalized one. 
The period of 1970s and 1980s is marked with direct monetary controls like direct credit allocation 
and annual credit plan etc. From 1991, Tanzania embarked on the policy of financial liberalization. 
Substantial institutional changes have taken place in the financial sector and a number of steps are 
being taken in this regard. The Banking sector is almost totally privatized and monetary policy is 
being pursued through indirect market measures. Therefore, it would be very important to have a 





fresh look over the issue that money and capital are complements or substitutes in Tanzania. This 
paper critically appraises the complementarity hypothesis in Tanzania by an empirical approach 
for the period 1970 to 2010. 
 
After this introduction the paper is organized in five other sections. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of financial repression as a basis of complementarity between money and investment in 
Tanzania. While section 3 reviews the literature, section 4 sketches out the methodology. Section 
5 reports and discusses the findings and section 6 concludes.   
 
2. A Brief Overview of   Financial Repression in Tanzania 
McKinnon, (1973) and Shaw, (1973) were the ones who introduced the term financial repression. 
Broadly speaking, financial repression is a term that describes measures by which governments 
channel funds to themselves as a form of debt reduction. Financial repression can include such 
measures as directed lending to the government, caps on interest rates, regulation of capital 
movement between countries and a tighter association between government and banks. The term 
was initially used to point out bad economic policies that held back the economies in less 
developed nations, (Goldsmith, 1969; Fry, 1982, 1988; King and Levin, 1993). 
 
An efficient financial system is a key element that influences growth of an economy as it allows 
efficient allocation of capital by bringing together deficit spending units and surplus spending 
units. Unfortunately, the importance of this process has received little attention in both developed 
and developing countries as governments have restricted competition, intervened and regulated 
the financial sector. It is believed that a repressed financial sector discourages both saving and 
investment because the rates of return are lower than what could be obtained in a competitive 
market. 
 
The rationale for financial repression has been the response to the simplistic interpretations of 
Keynesian theories. It was thought that, by controlling interest rates at reasonably low levels and 
by expanding the scope of government direct intervention, investment would greatly increase. 
Features of financial repression have revolved around several actions by government including 
caps or ceilings on interest rate, government ownership or control of domestic banks and financial 
institutions, creation or maintenance of a captive domestic market for government debt, restrictions 
on entry to the financial industry and directing credit to certain sectors.  
 
It is shown in URT (2001a) and BOT (2016) that after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 the Tanzania 
government stiffened its control over the financial system by nationalizing commercial banks, 
lending rate controls and by starting state development banks for industry and agriculture.  Interest 
rate controls were strictly applied from the 1970s to the late 1980s to all types of loans and deposits. 
The structure of interest rates was largely determined by the Bank of Tanzania, the central bank. 
Credit planning, a formal system of directed credit was undertaken through the Annual Finance 
and Credit Plans covering a large percentage of total lending. Likewise, concessionary lending 
rates were offered to priority sectors. The early nineties were marked by the establishment of a 
process of gradual liberalization of the financial system. Ceilings on lending rates began to dissolve 
in mid 1990s. However, the government still provided indicative interest rate levels. 
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In the 1960s, the economy performed fairly well as low inflation rates prevailed and moderate per 
capita income growth and investment rates were attained. However, the impressive performance 
was reversed beginning the mid 1970s as a number of shocks both internal and external led to severe 
macroeconomic imbalances. The shocks also hit hardest the financial sector undermining its 
efficiency and its role in influencing good performance of the economy.  Ndanshau and Kilindo 
(2016 ) observe that between 1972 and 1975 the State owned financial intermediaries as a measure 
towards providing finance for development. Institutions were established to support agriculture and 
housing and the Annual Finance and Credit Plan (AFCP) provided monetary policy implementation 
instead of monetary policy instruments. Based on the AFCP, the Government assumed the role of 
setting interest rates while State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were assured of credit. Most credit was 
allocated to public institutions many of which were not operating commercially. Despite that the 
government was not able to introduce tight financial discipline under a regime of high nominal 
interest rates and weak financial structure of   key financial institutions for fear of making many 
public enterprises and co-operatives collapse.  
 
The financial sector mainly rationed credit to government and public enterprises. To make things 
worse, the commercial requirement of paying interest and principal was not strictly followed and 
as a result, a number of enterprises accumulated payments arrears to the banking system. The 
private sector largely depended on self finance. The intermediation between private savers and 
private investors was not being attained. Reforms were called for to enable investors in the private 
sector to have access to loanable funds from financial institutions. 
 
It is further shown in Ndanshau and Kilindo (2016) that the interest rate ceilings set for lending by 
financial intermediaries led to very low nominal deposit rates that remained constant for an 
extended period only being increased in 1979 and 1981. Despite government control of commodity 
prices which underestimated official inflation both lending and savings interest rates remained 
negative prior to the reforms of 1986. Thus, the period 1967 to 1988 recorded low savings in general 
and financial savings in particular. Interest rates can be effective in mobilizing financial savings 
depending on the confidence of economic agents have in the banking system, the network of bank 
branches and efficient operation of the banks. The real interest rate in turn can be used in allocating 
credit depending on whether the banking system operates commercially and enterprises, including 
those in the public sector are required to pay back loans and interest. As mentioned above this was 
not the case during the period of financial repression. 
 
There was rapid increase in money supply mainly caused by borrowing by non-government 
institutions particularly marketing boards. Six marketing boards for coffee, cotton, cashew nut, 
sisal, tobacco and the National Milling Corporation were highly indebted to the banking system. 
There was continuous need for the government to provide finance to the marketing system 
indicating weakness of the marketing structure.  The financial burden made it difficult to check 
inflationary monetary expansion. 
 
To address ailments of the financial sector the president appointed a commission to review the 
structural, procedural and organizational arrangements and policy issues related to the financial 
system, The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary and Banking System in 
Tanzania, referred to as The Nyirabu Commission. The commission identified among other 
problems, that the financial sector was repressed by state ownership of banks and financial 





institutions which were monopolies and centrally controlled. The state and the party interfered in 
the business of the institutions and competition was stifled as they were highly protected. The 
government interfered in lending operations of banks and the fiscal stance was characterized by 
huge budget deficits coupled with high inflation (Satta, 1999; URT, 2007a). The presidential 
commission pointed out two major deficiencies. First was that the financial system did not 
adequately specify, and vest in the bank of Tanzania, the central bank, powers to license and 
supervise the banks and financial institutions. Secondly, no criteria were laid down for ensuring the 
soundness of the financial structure and management of banks and financial institutions.  
 
Until 1990, about 80 percent of the national bank of commerce loan portfolio involved loans to only 
twenty borrowers of which 19 were public enterprises and 65 percent of the loans were considered 
non-performing. The restructuring of public enterprises was thus required for health of the financial 
system to be attained (BOT, 2016). The recommendations of the Nyirabu Commission were 
addressed by reforms in the financial sector through the First- and Second-Generation Financial 
Sector Reforms (FGFSR and SGFSR) URT (2007a). The major policy measures of the First-
Generation Financial Sector Reforms removed the rigid controls of the government, and created the 
competitive environment by allowing the private sector to enter the financial sector services 
provision in Tanzania. 
 
The Bank of Tanzania had to strengthen their supervisory capacity, which is necessary for the 
stability and safety of the financial system. The FGFSR also established the foundation of the 
functioning of indirect monetary policy. The FGFSR main activities were in the restructuring and 
privatization of the State-owned Banks. The second-generation reforms were centered in a number 
of activities including among others: improving the monetary policy framework, improving the 
supervisory function, developing financial markets, establishing and promoting a viable and 
sustainable microfinance industry and establishing a policy framework and legal infrastructure for 
provision of long-term development financing.  
 
The Second Generation Financial Sector Reforms were succeeded by legislation of a number of 
acts covering institutions in the financial sector URT (2007a). These include the Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act (1991), Loans and Advances Realization Trust,(1991) the  Foreign 
Exchange Act,(1992) the Capital Markets and Securities Act(1994), the Bank of Tanzania Act 
(1995), the Insurance Act(1996) and the Land Act (1999). Major reforms in accordance to the 
recommendations elevated the economy to a stable macroeconomic environment through the 1990s 
to early 2000s. Despite that a joint WB/IMF report of 2003 observed that the financial system still 
played a limited role in the economy as depth and efficiency were not adequately achieved. Other 
financial repression indicators like small proportion of credit to the private sector, high interest rate 
spreads and huge bank holdings of government bonds still prevailed, URT (2007a). 
 
Table 1 displays some indicators of financial performance. Currency as a percent of M2 has stayed 
at around 30 percent for most of the period under study showing low rate of savings in banks. The 
real interest rate is still low despite reaching higher rates in recent years. This was not an outcome 
of interest rate increases but decline in inflation. Broad money ratio to output experienced up-and 
down swings during the period while claims on government as a share of total credit was high 
during the repression decade of 1980 to 1990. This indicator has declined by half beginning the 
year 1991 when liberalization measures resumed. Private sector credit is still below twenty percent 
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but has marked a big improvement from below 10 percent during the past two decades. Fluctuations 
have been experienced in bank deposits with an upward trend during the past fifteen years beginning 
year 2000. This coincides with increased entry of foreign banks following the opening up of the 
banking sector. 
 
Ndanshau and Kilindo (2016)  evidence a repressive financial sector as shown by high inflation and 
low nominal and negative real interest rates during the period under study as shown in  Figure 1. In 
the figure, panel (a) we display the nominal passbook interest rate, in panel (b) the inflation rate 
and in panels (c) and (d) are the real passbook interest rate and the savings rate respectively. The 
real pass book interest rate in Tanzania remained negative in most of the sample period. This was 
notwithstanding successful judicious monetary policy drives to tame inflation—which fell from 35 
percent in 1995 to 2% in 2004. Apparently, in spite of the upward adjustment of interest rates 
between 1986-1991, inflation decisively accounted for the negative real interest rate during and 
beyond the period. The slight improvement of real interest rates in the mid 1990s and 2000 was 
attained after abating inflation. In panel (d) it is seen that the ratio of the nominal financial saving 
to the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined between 1995 and 2000 but rose thereafter.





Table 1: Selected Financial Indicators in Tanzania 
Indicator  1980 -1985 1986-1990 1991-1994 1995-2000 2000-2010  
Currency /M2 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.34  
M2/GDP 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.41 0.35  
Private sector credit/GDP 3.4 4.6 5.1 11.7 14.3  
Claims on Government% of total credit 70 44 32 29 30  
Bank Deposits/GDP 35.13 11.03 15.30 15.3 13.5  
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2016) 
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3. Literature Review 
 3.1 Theoretical Literature 
The theory of financial repression is based on the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Patrick (1966) distinguishes the relationship in two causal 
relationships named ‘demand-following’ and ‘supply-leading’.  The framework defines ‘demand-
following’ as a phenomenon whereby modern financial institutions and financial services are 
created in response to demand in the real economy while ‘supply -leading’ is referred to creation 
of financial institutions and financial services is done in advance of demand for them. 
 
According to the ‘demand-following’ theory financial markets develop and progress following the 
increased demand for the services from the growing economy and evolution in financial markets 
is taken as a passive response to the growing economy. According to this theory, growth and 
expansion of the real sector generates new demands for financial services which in turn exert and 
intensify pressure to establish large and more sophisticated financial institutions to satisfy the new 
demand.  From this point of view, financial repression is a by-product or an outcome of continued 
government interference in the real sector. 
 
The opposing view of ‘supply-leading’ is that the presence of efficient financial markets increases 
the supply of financial services in advance of the demand for them in the real sector of the 
economy. When financial institutions are well-functioning economic efficiency is promoted, credit 
is created and expanded, savings are mobilized, capital accumulation is enhanced, and resources 
are transferred from the traditional sector to growth- leading sectors such as industry and services 
(Levine, 1993; Edwards, 1995; Fry, 1997; Gitau, 2014).  
 
The view is based on McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) with the policy of interest rate control, 
high reserve requirements coupled with inflation leads to negative real deposit rates and this 
impedes the financial deepening process. Low interest rates do not increase investment as 
Keynesian analysis postulates as savings mobilization is stifled. Figure 2 borrowed from Peter and 














































Figure 2: Financial Repression 
 
In the vertical axis we have R, the real interest rate and on the horizontal axis we have savings, S 
and investment I.  Savings is a positive function of real interest rate, and investment, a negative 
function of real interest rate. Following the theoretical exposition in Peter and Temidayo (2017) 
and Oluleye (2017), in a repressed financial sector the interest rate at R0 is set below the 
equilibrium interest rate RE, the intersection of the savings function and investment function. This 
results into a lower level of savings and thus lower investment at I0compared to equilibrium 
investment at IE. This exerts pressure in the demand for loanable funds which ought to increase 
the interest rate but financial repression limits it.  In the presence of limits in both deposit and loans 
more demand for investment occurs. Low interest rates on savings curb financial savings causing 
inadequate deposits to fund demanded level of investments. In such a situation banks are forced to 
ration credit in favour of big borrowers while small borrowers are deprived of credit, hampering 
development, Peter and Temidayo (2017). 
 
On the other hand, setting interest rates above equilibrium at R1, increases the level of savings. 
This constraints investment when ceilings are imposed on deposits but not on loans. Banks may 
hike interest rates on loans, making investors refrain from borrowing and hence hamper 
investment. In the absence of financial constraints, RE will be equilibrium real interest rate where 
S=I. But because of financial repression, the institutional interest rate given is less than the free 
market equilibrium real rate. The amount of actual investment is constrained to I0  because of the 
limited saving that is available at R0. As shown in Oluleye (2017) the basis of the argument is  
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Keynesian theory which asserts that, at a very low level of interest rates, people would prefer to 
hold their money balances in form of cash and thereby not avail them to deficit spending units for 
investment, Keynes (1936). Other effects of financial repression include lower consumption, if 
consumers refrain from savings and lower employment as less investment is realized. According 
to theory, if the monetary authorities are bold enough to abolish financial repression altogether and 
decide to dispense with the ceiling on the interest rate, then the level of actual saving and 
investment will rise further leading to a further expansion of income.  
 
Critics of the repression hypothesis including-van Wijnbergen, (1983a,b); Kohsaka, (1984), Lim, 
(1997), Liang , (1988), Shahin, (1990, 1996) arrived at their conclusions after examining the 
impact of financial liberalization policies and stabilization measures on economic activity when 
informal loan markets are incorporated in economic models.  In the models it is assumed that the 
informal loan market is the only market determined one and the organized loan markets are fully 
efficient in channeling funds in the intermediation process. Van Wijnbergen (1983a) argues in 
favour of financial repression rather than financial liberalization because  financial repression has 
many benefits for example on the bases of lower rate improve the loans performance, on the lower 
capital price enhance the equity, rate of growth accelerate if the loan is targeted in the direction of 
exporter and highly technological. He notes that McKinnon had not focused on informal real credit 
market where the poor borrower and lender involve for lending and borrowing purpose.  Other 
opposing views are by Fry (1978) who asserts that in this theory monetary as well as non-monetary 
assets both should be included. While McKinnon said availability of self-finance is important for 
private investment while according to Neoclassical approach price of capital is important for 
private investment. Moore (2010) argues that the financial repression theory is not suitable for 
middle income group of countries it’s just applicable for the less develop countries.  Increase in 
real rate of return doesn’t increase the proportion of saving because of external finance from which 
firms increase cash holding balances. 
 
Financial liberalization under this approach has been analyzed along four areas.  The first area 
assumes that an increase in the deposit rate would motivate the unorganized market funds into the 
banking system. The act of siphoning assets held in informal loan markets to the banking system 
may convey contraction moves to economic activity. The reason for this is that only a portion of 
funds deposited in the banking system is channeled into investments due to the rule of holding 
required reserves.  The second argument is that the decrease in informal market funds raises the 
informal market loan rate or the cost of financing working capital. This may result in inflation.  
According to Shahin (1990), this may result into stagflation as inflation and economic contraction 
are combined. 
  
Thirdly when funds move into savings out of unproductive assets such as currency or gold, and if 
the substitution effect between informal loans and bank deposits is low and reserve requirement is 
low, increasing the deposit rate could be expansionary.  Kohsaka, (1984) amplifies the above point 
by arguing that a high responsiveness of flow of savings with respect to the real interest rate on 
bank deposits is also necessary for successful liberalization policies. It has also been argued that 
though the long-term impact of savings may become very powerful in increasing real wealth and 
even overcoming the decrease in aggregate loan supply, in the short run they may not expand 
economic activity. Despite the counter-arguments, financial liberalization has received great 
attention in development policy. 






Chari et.al., (2016) observe that the idea that governments use banks to help raise funds is a 
conventional one. Central banks were founded specifically to raise funds for war expenditures. 
The banks were then governed and regulated to ensure that the government had access to a stable 
source of funding beyond national defense. Hayes (2020) observes that financial repression was a 
key element in explaining periods of time when advanced economies were able to reduce their 
public debt at a relatively quick pace. These periods tended to follow an explosion of public debt.  
In some cases, this was a result of wars and their costs.  More recently, public debts have grown 
as a result of stimulus programs designed to help lift economies out of recessions and hence 
possible resurgence of financial repression. 
 
According to Chari et al. (2016) financial repression was common immediately following World 
War II. Facing large postwar debts, many Allied countries practiced it on a large scale and ceased 
to do so only when their debts were reduced. Financial repression in this period involved regulatory 
measures requiring financial institutions to hold government debt and restricting international 
capital flows, thereby limiting the ability of consumers and financial intermediaries to invest in 
substitutes for their own government’s debt.  
 
The policy has re-appeared more recently in the wake of the recent Great Recession when, in the 
face of severe fiscal stress, numerous countries reinstituted various measures of financial 
repression. For developed countries, the urgent need to issue debt typically results from a sharp 
increase in government expenditures that occur in wartime. For emerging market economies, this 
same urgent need often results from a “sudden stop” in the willingness of foreigners to lend money 
to their domestic government.  Hoffmann (2019) opposes the view that governments might have 
to consider another wave of financial repression as a way out of the low growth-high dept trap. He 
argues that the history of advanced economies and the liberalization experience of the lagging 
countries suggest that an exit from financially repressive policies is the better alternative to 
promote growth and the sustainability of government finances. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical Literature 
Literature reveals that there are two opposing views on the effect of financial repression on 
economic growth. On the one side, in the spirit of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw(1973) it is argued 
that financial repression would have negative consequences on economic growth and financial 
development. Following this view are Vogel and Buser (1976), Kapur (1976), Fry, (1982,1988) 
and more recently Reinhart, (2012), Chari et al. (2016), Oluleye (2017) and  Peter and Temidayo 
(2017). 
 
The argument put forward by anti-repression policies is that there is a link between the money 
demand of consumers/savers to growth. A ceiling on deposit rate will reduce the tendency to hold 
money (deposits). This constraint on the liability side of the banking system balance sheet will 
lead to a reduction in credit supply. The ensuing reduction in working capital will reduce the 
growth rate, Kapur (1976). More specifically, financial repression has several effects as spelt out 
in Espinosa and Hunter (1994), Kilindo (2002, 2009a; b), Ndanshau and Kilindo (2016). 
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The strand of literature arguing against financial repression recommend financial liberalization as 
the way to attain fast economic growth , (Amsden and Euh, 1993; Arestis and Demetriades, 
(1997,1999). Espinosa and Hunter(1994) and  Gill (2005) list the specific ways that a financially 
repressed economy is likely to be adversely affected in a number of ways. First, reduction of the 
flow of loadable funds through the organized banking system, forcing potential borrowers to rely 
more on self-finance. Second, variation of interest rates on the reduced flow of bank lending from 
one class of favored or disfavored borrower to another. Third, impairing the process of self-finance 
within business enterprises and households. This results from a negative real yield on deposits, as 
well as coin and currency thus firms and families cannot easily accumulate liquid assets in 
preparation for making discrete investments.  Fourth, significant financial deepening outside the 
repressed banking system becomes impossible when firms are dangerously illiquid and/or inflation 
is high or unstable. 
 
On the other side, Keynesians argue that controlling interest rates at low levels and increased 
government intervention makes investments increase. According to Stiglitz (2000) government 
intervention in financial markets in the forms of financial repression and direct intervention 
through public sector banks - based on their assumed market failure- in line with a more or less 
stringent command economy,  enables it to direct resources to encourage the take-off of the country 
and concentrate those resources in sectors and companies that favor economic growth and 
development. The intervention by government in interest rate setting accelerates growth as lower 
interest rates encourage savings and the level of interest rates should bring full employment. 
Financial controls enhance aggregate savings and hence boost capital formation, investment and 
overall growth,  World Bank (1993); Edwards, (1995). In Stiglitz (1984) and Fry (1997) it is further 
argued that raising interest rates may increase the demand for credit by those who are most unlikely 
to repay their loans. The demand pushes further interest rates which in turn increases interest rate 
costs, pulling down profits earned by firms. Firms undertake riskier investments further increasing 
probability of defaults and adverse selection of projects. This may lead to deterioration of banks’ 
portfolios. Thus Stiglitz, op.cit. points out that raising interest rates beyond a certain level may 
lower banks’  overall return. Thus in order to raise the expected quality of borrowers, interest rates 
should be kept low. In that way financial repression can be used to encourage higher savings and 
more efficient allocation of capital for increased economic growth. 
 
Those who regard financial repression as a means used by governments to extract much needed 
development finance from the private sector and enhance development include  Stiglitz 
(1984,1994, 2000), Yulek (1997, 2017) Amsden and Euh (1993) . They argue that policies such 
as selective credit have produced positive results in Japan. Policies such as selective credit have 
produced positive results in Japan, South Korea and East Asian economies and China. Moreover, 
Xun,(2013) and Huang and Wang (2011) maintain  that financial repression can lead to capital 
flight but causality running from financial development to growth has been verified in Thailand 
China, Indonesia, Singapore, India and Malaysia and thus supporting the views of  financial 
liberalization. Stiglitz (1994) argues in favor of certain forms of financial repression. His views 
are that repression can have several positive effects such as: improving the average quality of the 
pool of loan applicants by lowering interest rates; increasing firm equity by lowering the price of 
capital; and accelerating the rate of growth if credit is targeted towards profitable sectors such as 
exporters or sectors with high technological spillovers.  
 





According to the proponents of financial liberalization developing countries are supposed to allow 
the financial sector to operate without restrictions in order that it operates efficiently, become 
healthier and deeper so that private business initiatives find financial support. This is in the spirit 
of growth theory suggesting supply-leading hypothesis that a country with a robust financial 
intermediation will grow faster. This then calls for reform of the capital market. It is believed by 
those supporting financial liberalization that shortcomings of financial repression that were 
thwarting economic progress such as credit shortage and deprivation of credit to private sector 
projects will end by lifting restrictions on banks and allowing private and foreign banks. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1: The Model 
McKinnon, (1973) asserts self-financed capital formation for financially constrained developing 
economies and developed the complementarity hypothesis. His contention is that a high real return 
on money induces the accumulation of real money balances, and this, in turn finances the costly, 
indivisible fixed capital. A dual process in which the demand for real balances (M/P) depends 
directly on the average real return on capital, and the investment to income ratio (I/Y) (the 
investment rate) rises with the real interest rate. The model assumes that government fiscal action 
has little role in affecting directly aggregate capital accumulation since public policy is limited to 
the control of the real return on holding money. Further, restrictions apply to the simplified 
assumptions about investment in self-financing domestic enterprises Moore (2010). 
 
The McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) methodology is the most used to establish the effects of 
financial repression. We follow the approach closely, using data spanning from 1970 to 2010. The 









, 𝑦 , (𝑑 − 𝜋))                              (1) 
 
 
(I/Y) is the investment rate , where, I denotes private investment, Y denotes nominal income, P is 
the price level, y stands for real income (Y/P); and (d -π) =real interest rate (nominal interest rate 
d minus anticipated inflation π). Another important equation that explains the complementarity 
hypothesis by McKinnon is that the investment function is expressed in terms of the real interest 





) = 𝑓((𝑑 – 𝜋), 𝑟)          (2) 
 
Where, r is the average return on physical capital. Equations (1) and (2) which we adopt are mostly 
used in standard analysis as in McKinnon (1973); Shaw (1973); Vogel and Buser, (1976); Gbosi, 
(2005); Oluleye, (2017).  The hypotheses with expected signs are as presented in Table 2. 
 
The derivative of money demand to the investment ratio represents the money demand for 
investment. An increase of investment allows a stronger money holding. In other words, the 
investment increases monetary saving. This condition is important for the success of financial 
liberalization policy for the transmission of saving to investment. 
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Table 2. Hypotheses and expected signs 
 









Positive  An increase in investment allows a stronger money holding 
2 𝜕(M P⁄ )
∂y
 
Positive Transaction demand for money increases as income increases 





A positive real interest rate allows a greater money holding in financially repressed 
economies 
4 𝜕(I y⁄ )/ ∂𝑟 Positive When the average return to capital increases investment increases in financially 
repressed economies 
5 𝜕(I y⁄ )/ ∂(𝑑 – 𝜋) Positive When the real interest rate increases, investment increases. 






In the estimation, investment is defined as gross fixed capital formation, the return on physical 
capital is proxied by average treasury bills yield and real deposit interest rate is defined as the 
difference between the deposit rate and the expected inflation rate. Gross Domestic Product is the 
measure of output, real money balances is measured by the ratio of money supply to the price 
level.  
 
The empirical verification of the financial repression hypothesis is carried out following the model 






) = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐼
𝑌





) = 𝛾0𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑 − 𝜋) + 𝛾2𝑡  𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟       (4) 
 
The financial repression theory hypothesis holds true if 
 ∂(I y⁄ )
∂(𝑑 –𝜋)









= 𝛽2 > 0. The next step is to capture the passage of the static to dynamic relationship. This 





) =∝0+ ∑ ∝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0 𝑋𝑡−𝑗+∑ ∅𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐼/𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑝












𝑗=0       (6) 
 
4.2 Data 
Data used in the estimation was obtained from the Bank of Tanzania publication, BOT(2016) and 
National Accounts publications. The real money balances (M/P) was derived by dividing broad 
money, (M2) with the National Consumer Price Index, Income was measured by Gross Domestic 
Product, investment was represented by Gross Fixed Capital Formation and the real interest rate 
was taken as the deposit rate minus inflation lagged one period, assuming that expected inflation 
is equal to past period inflation. The average return on capital was proxied  by Treasury bill interest 
rate (the average rates of the 35, 91, 180 and 364-day maturity treasury bills).  
 
 
4.3 Estimation Procedure 
4.3.1 Unit root tests 
Unit root test is used in econometrics to avoid spurious regression results. More commonly 
defined, a variable is integrated of order ‘d’, that is, I(d), if it has to be differenced d-times before 
it achieves stationarity. There exist several tests for unit root in time series data. We use the 
Phillips-Peron test which is among the most commonly used like the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test, which is associated with Dickey (1979) and Fuller (1981). The tests are based on the 
specification in equation 7. 




∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡
′𝛿 + 𝜖𝑡        (7a) 
 
The PP method estimates the non-augmented DF test equation (7) and modifies the 𝑡 ratio of the 
𝛼 coefficient so that serial correlation does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. 
The PP test is based on the statistic: 
 
      (7b) 
Where ?̂? is the estimate, and 𝑡𝛼  and t-ratio of 𝛼, 𝑠 𝑐(𝛼)̂ is coefficient standard error, and 𝑠 is the 
standard error of the test regression shown in equation 7.  In addition, 𝛾0 is a consistent estimate 
of the error variance in equation 7. The remaining term, 𝑓0, is an estimator of the residual spectrum 
at frequency zero.  
 
4.3.2 ARDL Model 
The most commonly used methods conducting the cointegration test include the residual based 
Engle-Granger (1987) test, and the maximum likelihood based Johansen (1991; 1995) and 
Johansen-Juselius (1990) tests. However, the OLS based autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration has become popular in recent years. According to Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997) the main advantage of ARDL modelling lies in its flexibility that it can be applied when 
the variables are of different order of integration. Another advantage of this approach pointed out 
in Laurenceson and Chai (2003) is that the model takes sufficient numbers of lags to capture the 
data generating process in a general-to-specific modelling framework and a dynamic error 
correction model (ECM) can be derived from ARDL through a simple linear transformation.  The 
ECM integrates the short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing long-run 
information. It is further shown in Laurenceson and Chai (2003), that using the ARDL approach 
avoids problems resulting from non-stationary time series data. 



































− 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡1. . . . . . (8) 
 












) 𝑡 − 𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖 𝛥
𝑝
𝑖=1







+ 𝜓2𝑙𝑛(𝑑 – 𝜋)𝑡−1+𝜓3𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡2 . . . . . (9) 
 





4.3.3   Innovative Accounting 
Innovative accounting involves estimating impulse response function (IRF) and variance 
decomposition (VDC).  This allows us to estimate the short run dynamics of the variables in the 
VAR. Among the two procedures we use the VDC approach to analyze the dynamics of the system. 
The forecast error variance decomposition allows for inferences to be made concerning the relative 
importance of each innovation towards explaining the behavior of the endogenous variables, Best 
et. al. (2017). In the context of this study the variance decomposition is a way to ascertain how 
much of the variance in forecast errors of future demand for real balances and  increased 
investment can be attributed to shocks in the independent variables.  
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics Results 
Descriptive Statistics results presented in Table 2 reveal that all the variables of the estimation 
model are about normally distributed. The Kurtosis is positive and less than three (3) for all 
variables and the Skewness is positive in all cases showing non-asymmetric tail. The Jarque- Bera 
statistic is statistically significant suggesting lack of potential autocorrelation. 
 




 Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera 
ln(M/P) 41 1100000 1910000 2.244868 2.3657 0.3652 
 Ln r 41 10.424 9.435 89.01439 0.8427302 0.0094 
ln(d -π) 41 16.885 8.926 0.7798158 2.52984 1.0943 
 Ln(I/Y) 41 20.903 6.081 36.98019 0.8099039 0.0787 
ln y 41 124000 78211.3 1.196151 2.216317 3.0152 
 
5.2 Unit Root Test Results  
The ADF results of the series in levels and first difference did not bring stationary series at first 
differencing but at second difference. We resorted to Philip-Peron (PP) stationarity  test procedure 
whereby unit root was attained after  first differencing. The results in Table 3 reject the null 
hypothesis that all the variables of the estimation model were stationary in level. All variables 
were differenced and then tested for unit root and the results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Philip-Peron (PP) Unit Root at Levels 
 
Variable With trend Without trend 
Test 
Statistics  




Critical Value of 
5% 
ln(M/P) -0.828 -3.548 -0.041 -2.958 
ln(d-π) -0.929 -3.548 -0.975 -2.958 
ln r -0.846 -3.536 -1.36 -2.958 
ln(I/Y) -1.733 -3.656 -0.805 -2.958 
Ln y -1.636 -3.564 0.335 -2.958 
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From Table 4, all series become stationary at first difference because the computed absolute values 
of exceed the critical  values both with and without trend, which lead us to reject the null hypothesis 
(δ = 0) that there is unit root or the time series is non-stationary.  
 
Table 4: Philip-Peron (PP) Unit Root at First Difference 
Variable With trend Without trend 
Test 
Statistics  




Critical Value of 
5% 
dln(M/P) -3.738 -3.544 -3.608 -2.961 
dln(d -π) -4.777 -3.544 -4.438 -2.961 
dlnr -5.815 -3.544 -5.671 -2.961 
dln(I/Y) -5.164 -3.544 -5.212 -2.961 
dlny -5.447 -3.544 -5.371 -2.961 
 
5.3 ARDL Results 
To test for the existence of long- run relationship between variables for Econometric Models 8 and 
9, we look at the F test statistic. In this approach the long run relationship of the underlying 
variables is detected through the F statistic. In this approach, long-run relationship of the series is 
said to be established when the F statistic exceeds he critical value band. The Bounds Test method 
developed in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) is used. 
 
The computed F statistic is 5.337 for Model 1. The relevant critical value bounds for this test 
presented in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels are [2.86-4.01]; [3.25-
4.49] and [3.74 -5.06] respectively. Since the F statistic exceeds the upper bound of the critical 
value band at1% level the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between the variables is 
rejected. This test result suggests that there exists a long-run relationship between the variables in 
Model 1. In addition the t-statistic is -3.73 while the Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) t-statistic at 
10%, 5% and 1% significance is [-2.86, -3.99]; [-3.13, -4.26] and [-3.43-,-4.60] respectively. The 
t-ratio results reinforce our conclusion that there is a long run relationship between the variables 
in levels.  
 
The computed F statistic for Model 2 is 4.952. The relevant critical value bounds for this test as 
shown in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels are [3.79-4.85]; [4.41-
5.52] and [5.15 -6.36]. Since the F statistic is less than the lower bound of the critical value band 
even at 10% level the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between the variables is rejected. 
This test result suggests that there exists a long-run relationship between the variables in Model 2 
at the 10% level. In addition the t-statistic is -3.72 while the Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) t-
statistic bands at 10%, 5% and 1% significance is [-2.86,-3.53]; [-3.13,- 3.8] and [-3.43,- 4.10] 
respectively. The t-ratio results reinforce our conclusion that there is a long run relationship 
between the variables in levels.  
 
Having rejected the null hypothesis of no long run cointegrating relationship between the variables 









Table 5: Model 1 ARDL Short Run Results: Dependent Variable is Δln(M/P) 
  Coef.  St.Err. t-value  p-value [95% Conf Interval] 
Δln(M/P) -2 
 
0.2343 0.1374 1.71 -0.1879 0.5949 1.0091 
Δln(M/P) -3 
 
0.5435 0.1028 3.34 0.004 0.2000 0.8871 
Δln(I/Y) -1 
 
0.2641 0.1952 1.35 0.0194 0.6759 0.1477 
Δln(d -π) -2 
 
0.1864 0.0908 2.05 0.056 -0.3784 0.0054 
Δln(d -π) -3 0.2706 0.0790 3.43 0.004 0.2122 0.9623 
Δln y-1 
 
0.3311 0.2240 1.48 0.158 -0.8037 1.1415 
Δln y-2 
 
0.2420 0.1941 1.25 0.229 -1.6761 0.6517 
Constant -1.0410 0.9846 -1.06 0.35 -0.1185 1.0363 
 
Looking at the results in Table 5, we find that the coefficient on investment and the real interest 
rate (with lags) conform with theoretical expectations in terms of sign and significance and support 
the McKinnon Complementarity hypotheses. The positive coefficient of investment-income ratio 
on demand for real balances supports the assumption of self-finance. A rise in investment to 
income ratio increases rather reduces money demand.  In the investment equation, it is evident the 
availability of credit raises the investment ratio and the positive relationship highlights the 
importance of high interest rates for capital accumulation. 
 
 A crucial finding is the positive and significant coefficient on (I/Y) in the money demand function 
and (d -π)  in the investment function, though at the second lag. These results provide robust 
empirical support for the compementarity hypothesis according to McKinnon’s theory.  It 
means that in order to attract savings, real interest rates should be kept high.  Lending capacity of 
financial intermediaries would increase funds available for investment and this can be attained by 
attracting more deposits. These results are in line with findings in Ndanshau and Kilindo (2016) 
and Kilindo, (2002, 2009a; b ) for the case of Tanzania. It is further shown in Table 6 that as the 
economy grows and the investment ratio increases, demand for real balances increases.  
 
Table 6: Model 2 ARDL Short Run Results: Dependent Variable is Δln(I/Y) 
  Coef.  St.Err. t-value  p-value [95% Conf Interval] 
       
Δln(d -π) -1 
 
-0.0922 0.0738 -1.25 0.021 -2.131 0.5863 
Δln(d -π) -2 
 
0.1306 0.0759 1.72 0.096 -0.0244 0.2858 
Δlnr -2 
 
0.1578 0.0757 2.08 0.046 0.0032 0.3127 
Constant 0.3038 0.7000 1.45 0.158 -0.158 0.7388 
 
The long run coefficients are reported in Tables 7 and 8.  They represent the equilibrium effects of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. The negative speed-of-adjustment coefficient 
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− ECM measures how strongly the dependent variable reacts to a deviation from the equilibrium 
relationship in one period or, in other words, how quickly such an equilibrium distortion is 
corrected.  
 
Table 7 : Model 1 Long Run  Results :Dependent Variable is Δln(M/P) 
 









 Interval]   
        
 Δln(I/Y)  
 
0.7840 0.2991 2.62 0.0180 0.1529 1.4150  
Δ ln (d -π)  
 Δln y 





























 Constant 2.007 0.190 10.58 0.000 1.623 2.391  
 
ARDL (4,1,4,3,3) 
Log likelihood = 61.20544    
Sample:     1974 -     2010                  
Number of obs.     =       37    
R-squared         =     0.8457 
Adj. R-squared     = 0.6733 
Log likelihood = 61.20544    








    
 
 
As the real interest rate and the average return on capital increase, the investment ratio increases 





















Table 8 : Model 2 Long  Run  Results : Dependent Variable is ln(I/Y) 
 






 Interval]  


























Sample:     1974 -     2010                  
Number of obs     =       37    
R-squared         =     0.322 
Adj R-squared     = 0.1986 
Log likelihood = 37.8006    








The estimation results support the complementarity hypothesis because our main test lies on the 
response of  money demand to investment  which is positive  and significant (0.7840 in Table 7) 
and the responsiveness of investment to the real interest rate which is also positive and 
significant (0.7795 in Table 8). 
 
5.4 Innovation Accounting 
5.4.1 Variance Decomposition results 
The results reported in Table 9 indicates that shocks to the real interest rate are the most important 
in explaining demand for real money balances followed by the real return on capital at about 30 
and 18 percent respectively. Taken together, shocks to interest rates account for close to 50 percent 
to variations in demand for real balances. This is in support of the financial repression theory which 
emphasizes interest rate liberalization. Own shocks of real money balances influence is the least, 
at most 8 percent in the fourth horizon. Regarding he investment ratio, it exerts 13 percent of the 
shocks on the demand for money balances. 
 
Table 9: Variance Decomposition of (M/P) 
 I/Y (d -π) r y (M/P) 
(M/P)-2 13.4 30.1 17.8 10.3 86.7 
(M/P)-4 4.7 44.3 10.4 9.3 8.2 
(M/P)-6 3.4 32.1 9.3 8.5 6.9 
(M/P)-8 2.7 12.3 7.5 6.4 5.9 
Notes: The number following the dash is the horizon. Entries show the percentage of the forecast 
variable of (M/P) at different horizons attributable to innovations in column variable 
 
Table 10 displays the shocks of the real deposit rate, the real interest rate, real income and 
investment rate own shocks. Similar to the case of real money balances, interest rates substantially 
explain investment (16.5 percent for real interest rate and 26.5 percent for real return on capital). 
Banks depend on savings deposits as a source of loanable funds and hence the real deposit rate 
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influences willingness to save as would the real interest rate. Real income shocks also influence 
investment substantially and ranks second after the real deposit rate. 
 
Table 10: Variance Decomposition of (I/Y) 
 r (d -π) y (I/Y) 
(I/Y)-2 26.5 16.5 17.3 72.7 
(I/Y)-4 14.6 13.2 15.7 9.8 
(I/Y)-6 16.3 12.8 9.3 3.5 
(I/Y)-8 4.2 5.5 2.5 1.2 
 
Notes: The number following the dash is the horizon. Entries show the percentage of the forecast 
variable of (I/Y) at different horizons attributable to innovations in column variable 
 
Table 11: Variance Decomposition of  (r) 
 r (d -π) y (I/Y) 
(I/Y)-2 62.5 10.5 7.5 5.9 
(I/Y)-4 6.7 44.3 8.9 2.8 
(I/Y)-6 17.4 18.8 19.4 1.8 
(I/Y)-8 0.89 3.5 2.8 1.6 
 
 
Table 12: Variance Decomposition of  (d -π ) 
 r (d -π) y (I/Y) 
(I/Y)-2 46.5 76.5 17.3 12.7 
(I/Y)-4 24.6 13.2 15.7 9.9 
(I/Y)-6 6.3 12.8 9.3 4.5 
(I/Y)-8 5.5 5.57 5.3 11.3 
 
Table 13: Variance Decomposition of  (y) 
 r (d -π) y (I/Y) 
(I/Y)-2 16.2 11.6 15.4 12.7 
(I/Y)-4 7.8 3.2 7.2 9.8 
(I/Y)-6 3.4 11.8 9.7 5.3 
(I/Y)-8 0.9 3.9 7.5 0.8 
 
 
5.4.2 Impulse Response Function Results 
While variance decomposition shows the response of the dependent variables from shocks on the 
rest of variables, it is unable to show whether the shock is positive or negative.  The impulse 
response graph enables us to see the sign of the shock by observing whether the function falls 
below zero along the horizontal axis or not. 
 
We are interested in determining how a dependent variable reacts to the shocks that attack other 
variables. We estimate the impulse response function to determine demand for real balances and 
investment against the shocks of the investment ratio, the real deposit rate and real income. These 
are the variables of main interest in our analysis. Looking at the Impulse Response Graphs in 





Appendix 1, it is seen that a one Standard Deviation shock (innovation) to real interest rates 
increase real money balances, while one Standard Deviation shock of the investment rate, and real 
income increase demand for real balances both in the short and long run. 
 
The response of a Standard Deviation shock of the real interest rate, the real deposit rate and real 
income on the investment ratio is positive in the short and long run. This is in support of 
McKinnon's complementarity hypothesis which emphasizes the role of deposits in encouraging 
self-financed investment. A rise in the deposit rate stimulates demand for capital by making 




The essential message of the McKinnon complementarity hypothesis is that a low or negative real 
rate of interest discourages savings and hence reduces the availability of loanable funds, constrains 
investment, and in turn lowers the rate of economic growth. Our empirical evidence reveals that 
under disequilibrium interest rates conditions higher real interest rates raise capital formation via 
the increase in real money balances. The positive influence of real interest rates on investment in 
terms of the self-financed physical capital proves to be a credible sign of the complementarity 
between the accumulation of money balances and physical capital in Tanzania during the period 
under study.  Policy of maintaining positive and market-determined real interest rate may induce 
the savers to save more, which will enable more investment to take place and exert a positive effect 
on investment.   
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